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An Institutional Perspective on the 
Employment Position of Temporary 
Workers in the Netherlands
JEROEN P. DE JONG
RENÉ SCHALK
TOBIAS GOESSLING1*
This article analyzes the complex employment position 
of temporary workers within organizations and on the labour 
market. Temporary employment is usually considered secondary 
to permanent employment. In recent years, the European Union 
and the Dutch government have attempted to change this situation 
by formulating several directives and labour laws. In this paper, 
we use institutional theory to discuss the institutional foundations 
and influences that shape the employment and labour-market 
conditions of temporary workers. The analysis shows that the 
core issues regarding temporary employment conditions include 
conflicting (legitimate) interests, socially constructed norms that 
favour permanent workers, and an uneven distribution of power. 
Our analysis further shows that institutional forces generate a 
structural justification for the disadvantaged position of temporary 
workers.
Temporary employment is widely used to provide organizations with 
labour flexibility, reductions in labour costs, and buffers for protecting 
the position of their core workers (Uzzi and Barsness, 1998). In addition, 
governments (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007) and individual workers (Giesecke 
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and Gross, 2003) consider temporary employment as a stepping-stone from 
unemployment to the active workforce and, possibly, to a permanent job. 
Combined with the increasingly unpredictable situation of the organizational 
environment, the instrumental use of temporary employment has made it 
an important resource in the economy and an important opportunity for 
employment.
Due to its significance, temporary employment has been extensively 
researched with respect to labour market positions (Bergstrom and Storrie, 
2003), organizational hiring strategies (Houseman, 2001), and employee 
level well-being and performance (Psycones, 2005). A consistent finding 
across these levels relates to considerable differences between temporary and 
permanent employment with respect to labour market positions (Remery, 
Van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2002) and employment conditions 
(Kalleberg, 2000; Goudswaard and Andries, 2002; OECD, 2002; Zeytinoglu 
and Cooke, 2005). As a result of this comparison, temporary workers are 
generally found to be worse off compared to permanent workers (Kalleberg, 
2000; McKeown, 2005). Temporary jobs are therefore regarded as a form 
of precarious employment, involving limited social benefits and statutory 
entitlements, low earnings, and poor working conditions (Cranford, Vosko, 
and Zukewich, 2003).
In recent years, political and legislative measures have been developed 
to regulate the precariousness of temporary workers. In the European 
Union—including the Netherlands—laws have been implemented to 
prohibit the unequal treatment of a type of temporary employment, fixed-
term contracts. Similar directives for temporary agency work are still under 
construction; however, at the EU level as well as in the separate countries, 
the negotiating parties have yet to reach consensus. The difficult process of 
implementing formal rules to protect temporary workers (Zappala, 2003) 
suggests that the precarious treatment of temporary workers is deeply 
embedded within the current system of industrial relations. This observation 
is supported by the results of a study by Nienhüser and Matiaske (2006), 
who found that country-enforced principles of non-discrimination had only 
limited influence on the compensation and working conditions of temporary 
employees. Moreover, awareness and legislation to protect employment 
conditions of temporary worker have caused little improvement in Canada 
(Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2005) and South Korea (Cho, 2004).
The instrumental use of temporary employment by organizations, 
governments, and even employees themselves appears to be a well-
established and persistent practice. The interests of the actors apparently 
do not correspond to the recent legislative attempts to improve the position 
of temporary workers. In this article, we use an institutional perspective 
to pull together literature on the current position of the temporary worker, 
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most specifically in the Netherlands. Our aim is twofold: firstly, we want 
to analyze the forces that are active on the position of temporary workers, 
and secondly to explain the difficult process of regulating precariousness 
of temporary workers. We analyze the interests, norms, and power of the 
actors who have roles to play in temporary employment: the government, 
unions, hiring organizations, and employees. Institutions, or the “rules of the 
game” (North, 1990: 3), can be regarded as systems of interrelated informal 
and formal elements (i.e., customs, shared beliefs, conventions, norms, and 
rules) that govern social relationships within which actors pursue and set 
the limits of legitimate interests (Nee, 2003: 23). The central question of 
this article concerns how formal and informal institutional influences shape 
the employment and labour-market conditions of temporary employment, 
most specifically in the Netherlands. We use institutional analysis to 
disentangle the complexity of the organizational and labour-market position 
of temporary workers.
Institutions develop over time and form the core of contemporary 
social systems. The current employment situation of temporary workers is 
the result of a long process of continuous development. Understanding the 
current situation requires explicit attention to origins and past developments. 
For this purpose, we draw from evidence across Western industrialized 
regions including the European Union, North-America and Oceania, but 
focus on the institutional setting of the Netherlands. The Dutch labour 
market has a long history of temporary employment, a relatively large 
percentage of the workforce is employed on temporary arrangements, and 
an extensive framework of (recently implemented) laws and regulations 
protects temporary workers. Furthermore, employment conditions and legal 
protection of, for example, part-time workers is considered as a model for 
other European Union countries, although this paper focuses on temporary 
employment rather then part-time employment.
This article is structured as follows. After a general discussion of 
the characteristics of temporary work, we provide an overview of the 
development of the position of temporary workers in the Netherlands, with 
a special focus on the extent to which the secondary position of temporary 
employment is institutionalized. We also discuss the implementation of 
formal rules regarding the non-discrimination principle and the protection 
of temporary workers in Dutch legislation. The next issue is the institutional 
position of temporary workers from the viewpoint of core actors in this 
industrial relations system (Dunlop, 1958): governments, unions, employers, 
and employees. We then analyze the tensions and confounding factors 
(e.g., power, norms, and interests) that influence the position of temporary 
employment. In the final section, we highlight the implications of our 
analysis.
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THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION OF TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT
Temporary employment is generally defined as “dependent employment 
of limited duration” (OECD, 2002: 170). The OECD considers temporary 
employment “dependent”, in the sense that it is subject to the hiring 
organization with respect to promises of long-term employment. Following 
this description, which is based on definitions of temporary employment 
used in countries including the US, Canada, and the Netherlands, a job may 
be regarded as temporary if the termination of the job is determined by 
objective conditions such as reaching a certain date or the completion of an 
assignment. Temporary jobs include types such as fixed-term employment, 
temporary agency work, seasonal employment, and traineeships.
Temporary employment has a relatively stable position on the Western 
labour market, although there are differences between countries. Table 1 
shows the labour market shares of temporary workers from 2000 to 2005 in 
a number of countries, including Germany, Spain, the US, Canada, and the 
UK. According to OECD, approximately 50 percent of all Spanish workers are 
employed in temporary arrangements, while in other European countries the 
percentage is somewhat lower: approximately 16% in Germany and 6% in the 
UK. The high share of temporary employment in Spain stems from legislative 
reforms in the 1980s, which were introduced to decrease unemployment 
(Caballer et al., 2005). Of the other countries represented in the table, Canada 
shows the highest share of temporary employment in comparison to Australia 
(5%) and the US (4%). In the Netherlands, temporary employment has gained 
a considerable share of the labour market; approximately 18 percent of all 
Dutch workers are employed in temporary jobs.
TABLE 1
Percentages of Temporary Work in 8 Countries and the EU (15)a
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Netherlands 16% 17% 17% 17% 17% 18%
Australiab 05% 05%
Canada 14% 15% 15% 14% 15% 15%
France 18% 17% 16% 14% 14% 14%
Germany 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 16%
Spain 47% 46% 47% 47% 47% 50%
United Kingdom 07% 07% 07% 06% 06% 06%
United Statesc 04% 04%
European Union-15 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 16%
a Data extracted from the OECD database, <www.oecd.org>
b
 Only 2001 and 2004 data available
c
 Only 2001 and 2005 data available
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In the literature, temporary employment is often referred to as 
“peripheral employment” (Walsh and Deery, 1999), “casual employment” 
(Campbell and Burgess, 2001), “non-standard employment” (de Vries 
and Wolbers, 2005) or “marginal employment” (Rodriguez, 2002). These 
terms emphasize the atypical and often secondary position of temporary 
workers, who are sometimes even referred to as “just temps” (Casey and 
Alach, 2004).
Recent studies on the characteristics of temporary and permanent 
work have revealed differences with regard to employment conditions and 
benefits. Empirical results from European, Dutch, and Canadian studies 
consistently show that, in general, temporary workers earn less than 
permanent workers do (see for example Schellenberg and Clark, 1996; 
Brown and Sessions, 2003; de Vries and Wolbers, 2005). In addition, many 
temporary workers are excluded from supplemental pension plans, health 
insurance, and other fringe benefits (McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, 2004; 
Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2005). Temporary agency workers are particularly 
likely not to receive these benefits; they also receive fewer opportunities 
for personal and professional development (e.g., training, education, and 
promotion). The limited access of temporary workers to additional training 
and education has been found consistently in several countries (Hanratty, 
2000; Aronsson, Gustafsson and Dallner 2002; Forrier and Sels, 2003), 
including the Netherlands (Goudswaard, Kraan and Dhondt, 2000).
The unequal opportunities that have been described above affect the 
mobility and employability of temporary workers. In general, temporary 
workers have fewer internal (McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, 2004) and 
external (Remery, Van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2002) career 
opportunities than permanent workers do. Temporary workers are usually 
the first to be dismissed when an organization must downsize (Garcia-
Serrano, 1998). The weak position of temporary workers is not limited to 
these aspects of employment relations. For example, temporary workers 
in the Netherlands have fewer opportunities to apply for mortgages or to 
receive public benefits in case of illness or unemployment (Klein Hesselink, 
Evers and Wevers, 1998).
These differences in the employment and working conditions of 
temporary and permanent employment are consistently found, even after 
controlling for factors related to human and social capital. For example, 
Nienhüser and Matiaske (2006) found greater levels of precariousness in 
fifteen EU countries for both fixed-term and temporary agency workers, 
as compared to permanent workers, after controlling for several personal 
and work-related variables. The association of secondary employment 
with short-term work shows the structural underestimation of temporary 
employment, relative to the standard of permanent employment.
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One important question concerns the manner in which this treatment 
of temporary employment evolved. How did temporary employment arrive 
at its current position? For complexity reasons, we limit our analysis to the 
situation in the Netherlands.
A Background to Temporary Employment in the Netherlands
As in most countries, the development of temporary employment 
in the Netherlands started in the beginning of the 1970s (Delsen, 1995). 
Companies called for relaxing rules with respect to labour contracts and 
more opportunities for flexible labour agreements (Looise, Van Riemsdijk 
and De Lange, 1998). At first, scholars, policy makers, union representatives, 
and human-resource practitioners were sceptical about the use of temporary 
workers. They likened temporary workers to a Trojan Horse, arguing that 
such workers undermine the foundations of long-term industrial relations 
with regard to rewards, freedom, variety in work, job security, benefits, 
and other facilities (Albeda, Van de Braak and Veldkamp, 1972). In the 
70s, the overall view of temporary arrangements was that they were for 
“weaker workers”, implying that women, younger workers, older workers, 
and immigrants were over-represented in the temporary workforce (Albeda, 
Van de Braak and Veldkamp, 1972). Van de Braak and Faase (1978) and 
other Dutch scholars even attributed working in temporary jobs to the 
incomplete development of commitment to work.
An economic crisis between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s weakened 
the position of temporary workers even further. The unemployment rate 
was high in the European Union, relative to the United States and Japan, 
and job creation was decreasing. Many European countries, including the 
Netherlands, began to relax various regulations and laws for hiring and firing 
personnel. This lead to an increase of the number of temporary employees in 
the Netherlands; between 1987 and 1996 the share of temporary employees 
on the Dutch labour market more then tripled (Looise, Van Riemsdijk 
and De Lange, 1998). This increased labour flexibility was regarded as 
a means of creating competitive advantage (Delsen, 1995); the aim was 
to improve the ability of employers to use staffing strategies to achieve 
financial gains (Locke and Kochan, 1995). Such policies obviously did not 
improve the position of temporary workers; as they increasingly came to be 
regarded as commodities, temporary workers became even more vulnerable 
to exploitation. For Dutch employees, temporary work became “take-it-
or-leave-it” employment, as it was one of the few alternatives between 
permanent employment and unemployment.
Protective Measures for Temporary Workers
In the past decade, the debate concerning regulating conditions of 
temporary employment has largely focused on balancing flexibility and 
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security (Sels and Van Hootegem, 2001; Auer and Cazes, 2002), has aimed 
at improving employment security for temporary employees and extending 
opportunities for using temporary employment by organizations. In the 
Netherlands, this has led to instatement of the ‘Flexicurity’ Act in 1999.
In recent years, however, employment and working conditions of 
temporary workers have received more specific attention in Canadian, 
European, and Dutch labour policy and debates (Vigneau et al., 1999; 
Heerma van Voss, 1999; Vallée, 2005). In 1997, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) reached the following conclusion regarding the 
equal treatment of temporary workers: “Measures should be taken, as 
appropriate, to ensure that contract workers are afforded equal treatment 
with employees of the user enterprise or, as the case may be, with employees 
of the subcontractor or of the intermediary, for performing work which 
is essentially similar, under similar conditions and requiring similar 
qualifications” (ILO, 1998).
In the Netherlands, a law based on an EC directive (70/EC) was issued 
in November of 2002. This law on equal treatment of temporary workers, 
however, explicitly includes the possibility that differential treatment may 
be justified by objective reasons. Because Dutch labour laws do not define 
“objective justification,” the interpretation is based on jurisprudence and 
the interpretation of the actors involved. According to the Stichting van de 
Arbeid (the Labour Foundation), a governmental organization that promotes 
good employment conditions, objective justification exists when there 
is a legitimate goal that can be reached only by differentiating between 
temporary and permanent workers (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005). The 
legitimacy of the goal is determined by a) the extent to which the goal meets 
an actual need and b) the extent to which the difference was intended. In 
conclusion, discrimination does not necessarily refer to treating someone 
better or worse than someone else, but to the extent to which differences 
between temporary and permanent workers are illegitimate (see also 
Vigneau et al., 1999).
DIFFERENCES IN THE INTERESTS OF ACTORS IN THE 
SYSTEM: CONFLICTING LEGITIMACIES?
The formal laws and rules that are described in the previous section 
acknowledge the existence of unequal treatment for temporary workers, 
and their intent is to deal with this by changing the “rules of the game.” 
According to institutional theory, “institutional change does not simply 
involve remaking the formal rules, but fundamentally (…) requires the 
realignment of interests, norms, and power” (Nee, 2003: 23-24). Following 
Nee (2003), the combination of and interaction between the interests, norms, 
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and power of the actors in the industrial relations system determine the 
match (or mismatch) between formal and informal rules. Legitimacy is a 
central concept in this respect, as it gives insight into the motivations of 
the actors. We adopt Suchman’s (1995: 574) definition of legitimacy as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity (or actor) 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”
The next section contains a more specific discussion of the alignment 
and legitimacy of interests, norms, and power. Our analysis builds on the 
concept of the hierarchical organization of formal institutions (North, 
1990), as well as on Dunlop’s Industrial Relations Systems framework 
(Dunlop, 1958; see also Meltz, 1993). The discussion begins by addressing 
governmental interests, proceeds to assess the influence of these interests at 
the union and firm level, and ends by examining influences at the employee 
level. At each level, the discussion is guided by a fundamental dilemma. 
The governmental dilemma concerns how to balance worker rights with 
economic and labour market flexibility. The union dilemma involves the 
combination of equal employment rights with the protection of the position 
of core workers. Firms face the dilemma of choosing between continuity 
(workforce development) or flexibility and labour-cost reduction. The 
central dilemma for employers centres on the difference between the model 
of equal work and pay and that of temporary employment as a stepping-
stone to permanent employment.
The Governmental Dilemma: Worker Rights versus Economic and 
Labour-Market Flexibility
The Dutch government considers the implementation of laws and 
regulations to prevent the unequal treatment of temporary workers as 
desirable, proper, and appropriate (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005). A 
central issue for the appropriateness of the laws and rules is the norm of 
non-discrimination. This principle, which was included in the first act of 
the Dutch constitution, forbids discrimination on any grounds, including 
temporary or permanent employment. The norm of non-discrimination 
has led to the implementation of rules concerning the pay and working 
conditions of temporary workers, as well as rules that are designed to 
improve the labour-market position of temporary workers.
Dualistic or segmented labour-market theories can be used to analyze 
the division of the labour market and mobility on the labour market 
(Loveridge and Mok, 1979). According to these theories, labour markets 
can be divided into primary and secondary segments. Piore (1971) defines 
jobs in the secondary segment as employment with low wages, poor working 
conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and often arbitrary 
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discipline, and little opportunity to advance. Theoretically, temporary 
workers are likely to occupy the low-quality jobs in the secondary segment. 
The limited mobility from the secondary to the primary segment, which is 
another core assumption of dual labour-market theory, probably provides 
a more accurate reflection of temporary employment. Dutch data show that 
approximately forty percent of all temporary workers acquire permanent 
jobs within a rather short period of time (Remery, Van Doorne-Huiskes 
and Schippers, 2002). About fifty percent remain in temporary jobs or 
become unemployed (Zijl, Van de Berg and Heyma, 2004). Employees who 
are engaged in temporary employment on a structural basis and who lack 
the opportunity to move into another segment are therefore dependent on 
consecutive temporary arrangements for their employment. If firms provide 
no specific training to these workers, their position on the labour market 
becomes structurally weakened, leading to the “trap” situation.
Temporary employment also addresses another interest of the 
government, however, and facilitating the instrumental utilization of 
temporary employment is also a prominent goal of government policy. In 
its draft directive on temporary agency work, the European Commission 
recognized TAW as an “important cog in the machinery of labour markets 
as undertakings have been seeking greater flexibility in job management” 
(2002: 8). Labour flexibility is considered one of main issues in Dutch 
economic policy, enabling organizations to adjust to fluctuating demands 
and to allocate labour to meet consumer demands. Labour flexibility is 
assumed necessary in order to provide low-threshold jobs that create 
opportunities for workers to enter or re-enter the workforce to gain 
experience and expertise. Based on these arguments, governments have long 
been reluctant to develop legislation and policy directives for temporary 
work (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000). The secondary segment of the 
labour market is of social importance, as it provides at least some level of 
employment when high-quality employment is either not available or not 
accessible. Easily obtained temporary arrangements can be used to escape 
from unemployment or to return to work after a period of labour market 
inactivity (Heinrich, Meuser and Troske, 2005). The “transitory” task of 
temporary employment is regarded by some as an essential and desirable 
solution to the problem of unemployment (e.g., Schmid, 1995).
In addition to the arguments above, the “stepping-stone” or “bridge” 
hypothesis suggests that entrants to the labour market can use secondary 
jobs to test, improve, and develop their skills, enabling them to improve their 
positions on the labour market within a relatively short time. Legislation 
could hinder the legitimate functions of the secondary labour market. As 
temporary workers gain better employment rights, they are likely to become 
less attractive to employers (Biggs, Burchell and Millmore, 2006). The 
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decline in temporary employment after the implementation of the Flexibility 
and Security Act in the Netherlands is one example of this effect. After 
the implementation of this law, which should improve the job security of 
temporary (agency) workers, the share of temporary employment declined 
significantly. Studies evaluating the effects of the law showed that only 
a small proportion of temporary workers gained permanent employment 
(Klaver et al., 2000; van den Toren, Evers and Commissaris, 2002).
The Union Dilemma: Equal Employment Protection versus 
Protection of Core Workers
Temporary employment also poses a dilemma for unions. On the one 
hand, there is a growing recognition among unions of the importance of 
equal rights for—mostly not unionized—temporary workers. On the other 
hand, temporary workers can be considered competitors of the permanent, 
unionized workers. Therefore, permanent workers could benefit from 
having unprotected temporary workers in the firm, in situations in which 
the temporary workers provide a buffer to protect permanent workers from 
being laid-off (Heery, 2004; Campbell, 2005; Olsen, 2005).
Dutch unions have a long history of opposing temporary work, as they 
have tended to regard temporary employment as a threat to the secure, 
long-term employment relationships that they sought to protect (Koene, 
Paauwe and Groenewegen, 2004). Union policies towards non-standard 
labour have therefore tended to be hostile or defensive, and to be aimed 
primarily at excluding temporary employment as much as possible (Looise, 
van Riemsdijk and De Lange, 1998). In recent years, Dutch union policies 
toward temporary employment have changed. There is a growing recognition 
of the importance of employment rights for temporary workers. The focus 
in union policies has shifted to the regulation of temporary employment, 
and unions are increasingly engaged in trying to represent temporary 
workers and regulate the terms and conditions of their employment. Firstly, 
regulation would prevent undercutting of permanent workers (Heery, 2004). 
Employing cheaper temporary workers could imply a threat to permanent 
employees. Second, temporary employment is growing in all areas, and 
recruitment among these workers provides unions with a stronger financial 
base (Campbell, 2005). Furthermore, it is clear among unions that they need 
to provide support to those that need it the most (Croucher and Brewster, 
1998).
Although this changed attitude may indicate a legitimate interest in the 
rights of temporary workers, the primary goal of unions appears to remain 
the protection of the permanent, core workforce (Croucher and Brewster, 
1998). The “equal work, equal pay” campaign of the Dutch unions provides 
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an illustrative example. In 2006, The FNV (Federation of Dutch Unions, 
the largest union in the Netherlands) actively promoted a policy against 
the low pay and poor working conditions of temporarily employed Middle 
and Eastern European workers. In a letter to the Dutch cabinet, however, 
the FNV stated, “The FNV has observed that there are heavy threats to 
working conditions in several sectors, including construction and transport, 
and that existing permanent worker employment benefits in these sectors are 
in danger.” Although the FNV emphasizes the importance of their actions 
to preventing the exploitation of temporary workers, their explicit primary 
concern was apparently to gain employment security for their members, 
who had permanent contracts.
The difficulties that unions face with regard to the interest of supporting 
equal treatment have to do with the traditional focus of unions on permanent 
employment. In addition, there has been some debate concerning the 
joint representation of temporary and permanent workers. In collective 
bargaining, the unions feel the tension between representing the interests 
of the majority—the full-time, permanent workforce—and the rights of 
the minority (Blackett and Sheppard, 2003). According to Blackett and 
Sheppard (2003), the transition towards individualized, insecure jobs is 
the crucial issue for collective bargaining and minority rights. The insecure 
and short-term character of temporary employment is one cause of the low 
level of unionization among temporary employees. It is therefore difficult 
for Dutch unions to organize temporary workers (Goslinga and Sverke, 
2003). Temporary employees in the Netherlands are not often members of 
the union; the situation is similar in Spain, Great Britain, and other countries 
(Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano, 2004). This situation obviously limits 
implicit bargaining power and access to the rights of temporary workers, 
and the power of unions in the Netherlands to negotiate equal employment 
and working conditions.
The Dilemma for Hiring Organizations: Workforce Investments 
versus Flexibility and Labour Costs
For organizations hiring temporary workers, the challenge consists 
of balancing two contradicting legitimate interests: the desire to adapt to 
external technological, competitive, and labour market pressures through 
a motivated and skilled workforce on the one hand, and on the other, the 
desire to reduce labour costs (see, for example, Ward et al., 2001).
The classic human-resource perspective is that a motivated and 
committed workforce is needed for the continuity of the organization. This 
implies that organizations must be willing to invest in their workforce and 
to reward continuous performance. Within such high-commitment systems, 
firms motivate workers and try to keep them committed as a means of 
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ensuring performance and the continuous development of employee skills. 
For organizations that hire temporary workers, investing in a high level of 
employee motivation and commitment makes less sense. This argument 
refers to human capital theory (Becker, 1964), which postulates that 
investments in personnel (such as training and education) should yield 
returns in the future. This suggests that Dutch organizations deliberately 
differentiate between a core “investment-worthy” population of employees 
and a peripheral group for whom investments should be carefully evaluated 
(see for example, Looise, van Riemsdijk and De Lange, 1998). The core 
population of employees consists primarily of permanent workers, although 
a trend has been reported recently whereby temporary employment is 
being used within investment-intensive core jobs for extended trial periods 
(Donker van Heel, 2000; Houseman, 2001).
Moreover, hiring temporary employees currently remains primarily an 
organizational strategy for creating a peripheral population that can be used 
to achieve numerical flexibility, as a buffer to protect the employment of 
core workers, and to cut costs (Looise, van Riemsdijk and De Lange, 1998; 
see also Ward et al., 2001). This instrumental use of temporary work does 
not necessarily imply unequal treatment. Many theories on staffing and 
human resource management discuss organizational legitimacy issues with 
respect to the treatment of temporary workers. For example, Atkinson’s 
(1984) model of the flexible firm advocates the use of temporary workers 
as peripheral and disposable employment to cope with the uncertainty of 
the market. The implications for core employees are that their favourable 
employment conditions “will increasingly be secured at the expense of 
others” (Atkinson, 1984: 31). Lepak and Snell’s (1999) Human Resource 
Architecture theory offers an explanation for why organizations are reluctant 
to invest in temporary workers. According to these authors, strategies 
to externalize workers result from the low value and the low level of 
uniqueness of the human capital that is ascribed to these workers. This 
position holds in situations that require generic human capital that is of 
limited strategic value, and in which the firm’s competitive position is not 
threatened. Organizations that follow this strategy rarely invest in training 
or development activities for their employees.
The Employee Dilemma: Equal Work and Equal Pay versus 
Stepping-Stone
The non-discrimination norm, which holds that all workers should 
be treated in an equal manner in similar situations, is a fundamental 
principle in labour rights. For temporary employees, acceptance of and 
compliance with the rule of equal treatment depends on their own beliefs 
concerning the desirableness and appropriateness of the rule. We return 
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to the ‘trap’ and ‘stepping stone’ hypotheses to explain how different 
interests among temporary workers shape these beliefs of desirableness 
and appropriateness.
The idea behind the trap hypothesis is that workers become entrapped in 
their temporary job because they have little chances of advancement (Steijn, 
Need and Gesthuizen, 2006). Workers who are trapped into their temporary 
job are likely to be forced into temporary employment because it is difficult 
for them to acquire permanent positions (de Jong et al., 2005). For these 
workers, similar wages, fringe benefits, and opportunities for training and 
individual development would at least improve their employment conditions 
and, possibly, their labour market position. Being trapped in a temporary job 
would therefore be associated with desirability for equal treatment rules.
The stepping stone or bridge hypothesis assumes that employees accept 
temporary jobs that offer chances for rapid promotion (Steijn, Need and 
Gesthuizen, 2006). In general, employees tend to have a strong preference 
for permanent employment (Silla, Gracia and Peiro, 2005). According to 
Marler and Milkovich (2000), this is partly because employees believe 
that permanent jobs yield greater returns. This seems to suggest that most 
temporary workers hold their positions involuntarily. Many temporary 
workers, however, attempt to gain access to permanent employment by first 
accepting temporary positions. De Jong and colleagues (2005) found that a 
large proportion of Dutch temporary workers use temporary employment 
as a stepping-stone toward permanent employment. Although they do 
not necessarily prefer temporary employment, they deliberately opt for 
temporary jobs that offer the prospect of permanent employment. For these 
temporary workers, equal treatment could imply less access to temporary 
employment, as organizations are less able to achieve labour cost advantages 
through temporary employment. Because stepping stone workers use their 
temporary job to obtain permanent employment, equal treatment and more 
limited access to permanent work would be undesirable.
These two conflicting interests of temporary workers have in common 
that they depend upon their employer. Trapped temporary workers are 
dependent on their employer to keep their job. Stepping stone workers 
are dependent upon their employer with respect to acquiring permanent 
contracts, which may influence their willingness to accept the working 
conditions that accompany such positions (Lepak and Snell, 1999). In 
conclusion, this dominant position of the hiring organization limits the 
possibilities for temporary employees to resist, and reinforces the complicit 
acceptance of their position (Jordan, 2003).
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DISCUSSION
In this research, we have analyzed the dilemmas that are present 
among actors with respect to equal treatment of temporary and permanent 
workers. At every level of the employment relations system, actors are 
subject to influences that guide their behaviour with respect to temporary 
employment. The institutional perspective allows the examination of 
behavioural dilemmas that are grounded either in legitimate interests or in 
what is perceived to be desirable, proper, and appropriate. These interests 
are constructed according to a system of norms and sustained by levels and 
types of power. The context of these institutionalized beliefs reflects the 
legitimacy of the actions of the actors. In other words, it reflects whether 
the actions are taken purely out of self-interest, a desire to “do the right 
thing,” or according to “taken for grantedness” (Suchman, 1995).
Table 2 summarizes the influences for each of the actors, with regard 
to interests, norms, and power. This overview is based on the extended 
descriptions of the dilemmas for each party that are provided in the previous 
sections.
TABLE 2
Institutional Influences on the Treatment of Temporary Workers, by Actor
Actor Interests Norms Power
Government Worker rights
Employment
Flexibility
Non-discrimination
Employment
Legislative
Unions Employee rights
Prevent undercutting 
permanent workers
Equal employment
Protection of members
Bargaining
Organizations Human Capital
Flexibility
Adaptability Employment
Investment
Employees Equal treatment
Stepping stone
Permanent employment Compliance
At every level, norms and power issues influence the interests of the 
parties involved with regard to the treatment of temporary workers. Each 
actor faces a dilemma, a conflict between interests, norms, and power. For 
all actors, three main informal influences can be identified that conflict 
with the formal rule of equal treatment: the flexibility of the economy, 
protection of the position of permanent workers, and labour market 
mobility. The government and hiring organizations benefit from labour 
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flexibility and thus prefer cheap temporary employment that provides 
economic competitiveness. Organizations and unions think of peripheral 
temporary employment as a buffer to protect permanent employment, 
thus sustaining continuity. Hiring organizations consider the return on 
investment when assessing the benefits of investing in temporary employees. 
Unions, however, prefer equal treatment of temporary workers as a means 
of preventing threats to the wages of permanent workers. Finally, for 
governments and employees, “cheap” temporary employment provides 
opportunities for gaining access to the labour market and to permanent 
employment. For these actors, equal treatment could improve employment 
conditions for those who are trapped in temporary employment.
The conflicting inter-actor interests are caused primarily by two forces 
that act simultaneously: the maximization of profits, power, and welfare, 
and the protection of the standard of permanent employment. Permanent 
employment is the standard form of employment for all actors, against 
which the value of employment and the conditions and opportunities of 
employment relations are evaluated (Dickens, 2004). Furthermore, referring 
to stereotypical characteristics of the members of these groups legitimizes 
differences between permanent and temporary employees. Governments, 
unions, organizations, and employees therefore tend to consider temporary 
employment as a sort of “second-hand” employment (Boyce et al., 2007), 
in terms of organizational and union membership, added value, and 
employment security. Even temporary workers tend to rate themselves as 
lower status employees in comparison to permanent workers (Von Hippel, 
2006). These views often reflect taken-for-granted cultural beliefs that 
support social inequality (Tyler, 2006: 385). This culturally embedded 
legitimacy, which is reflected at every level of the institutional system, is 
a primary source of risk for exploitation and unequal treatment on the part 
of temporary workers.
In conclusion, the difficulties of aligning interests, norms, and power 
tend to institutionalize the secondary position of temporary workers in the 
Netherlands, and at the same time complicate institutional change. Basically, 
the short-term nature of temporary work is a fundamental weakness that 
conflicts with the principle of equal treatment (Vigneau et al., 1999). This 
causes many temporary workers to be locked into precarious employment, 
subject to conflicting interests based on well-established norms, but without 
power to change their situation. In the near future, research should indicate 
the exact consequences of the new legislation, in the Netherlands but also 
in other countries actively protecting temporary workers. Furthermore, 
accumulated evidence shows that temporary workers in other Western 
countries experience poor working conditions (Saloniemi and Zeytinoglu, 
2007). Therefore, future research should focus on the position of temporary 
workers in other institutional settings.
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Moreover, this research assumed that all temporary workers are subject 
to precarious employment conditions and similar institutional forces. 
Therefore, more detailed focus can be put on the positions of forms of 
temporary employment, and groups that occupy them. Temporary agency 
work, for example, fundamentally differs from fixed-term contracts 
because it involves a triangular relationship between the agency, the hiring 
organization, and the temporary worker (Davidson, 2004). With respect to 
the position of temporary agency workers, this specific industrial relations 
system should be analyzed more thoroughly. Finally, research has indicated 
that some demographic groups, including women (Cranford, Vosko and 
Zukewich, 2003) and low skilled workers (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 
2005) are overrepresented in temporary and precarious employment. More 
research is needed to more explicitly assess the institutional position of these 
groups in the context of precarious temporary employment.
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RÉSUMÉ
Une perspective institutionnelle de la situation d’emploi des 
travailleurs temporaires aux Pays-Bas
Cet essai se veut une analyse de la situation d’emploi des travailleurs 
temporaires au sein des organisations et du marché du travail. Aux Pays-
Bas, le travail temporaire s’est taillé une part considérable du marché 
du travail et près de quinze pourcent de tous les travailleurs hollandais 
occupent des emplois temporaires (par exemple, des emplois contractuels à 
durée déterminée et des emplois temporaires de sous-traitance). Cependant, 
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l’emploi temporaire est considéré comme secondaire en regard de l’emploi 
permanent. Les conclusions de nos études qui comparent les travailleurs 
temporaires aux travailleurs permanents démontrent que les travailleurs 
temporaires gagnent des salaires plus faibles, ont accès à moins d’occasions 
de formation et reçoivent des avantages d’emploi moins nombreux que 
ceux qui ont des postes permanents. L’association de l’emploi secondaire 
au travail à court terme donne lieu à une sous-évaluation structurelle de 
l’emploi temporaire, quand on le place en regard de la norme de l’emploi 
permanent.
Dans cet essai, nous analysons les intérêts, les normes et le pouvoir des 
acteurs qui ont un rôle à jouer dans le domaine de l’emploi temporaire : les 
gouvernements, les syndicats, les entreprises d’embauche et les employés. 
La question principale de l’étude consiste à se demander comment des 
influences institutionnelles, formelles ou informelles, façonnent les 
conditions de travail et du marché du travail dans le domaine de l’emploi 
temporaire aux Pays-Bas.
La croissance des agences de travail temporaire et la manière dont 
l’emploi temporaire est devenu accessible par une adaptation des règles et 
des normes fournissent une illustration du processus par lequel le travail 
temporaire s’institutionnalise dans son rôle à titre d’emploi secondaire. 
Récemment, les droits fondamentaux des travailleurs temporaires sont 
devenus un enjeu principal dans les conflits du travail et les débats. En 
1999, la Commission européenne a passé la résolution 70/CE, en complétant 
par le fait même la législation spéciale sur l’équité de traitement des 
travailleurs engagés pour une durée déterminée. Aux Pays-Bas, une loi 
s’appuyant sur la résolution de la Commission européenne a été adoptée 
en novembre 2002. Pour les travailleurs temporaires hollandais, cette loi 
venait étendre la protection existante contre un traitement inéquitable. La 
combinaison des incitations diverses (ou l’inverse) et leur interaction qui 
ressortent du cadre institutionnel et des intérêts légitimes, des besoins et 
des préférences des acteurs du système industriel façonnent l’appariement 
(ou l’absence d’appariement) des règles formelles et informelles. La partie 
analytique de cet essai aborde une discussion de l’alignement et de la 
légitimité des intérêts et des règles en opposition, et également des intérêts, 
du pouvoir et des normes qui influencent les acteurs individuels, incluant 
les gouvernements, les syndicats et les salariés.
Pour les gouvernements, la norme de non-discrimination a amené la 
mise en œuvre de règles concernant la rémunération et les conditions de 
travail des travailleurs temporaires, de même que des règles élaborées de 
manière à améliorer la situation des travailleurs temporaires sur le marché 
du travail. Les salariés qui sont engagés dans des emplois temporaires sur 
une base structurelle et qui n’ont pas l’occasion de se déplacer vers un autre 
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segment deviennent alors dépendants des aménagements temporaires qui 
s’en suivent pour leur emploi. Par contre, la flexibilité du travail est perçue 
comme nécessaire afin d’offrir des emplois de bas niveau qui deviennent 
des occasions pour les travailleurs d’intégrer ou de réintégrer la force de 
travail et d’acquérir de l’expérience et de l’expertise.
Pour les syndicats, le travail temporaire présente un défi. D’un côté, 
les travailleurs temporaires, dont la plupart ne sont pas syndiqués, peuvent 
être perçus comme des concurrents aux travailleurs permanents syndiqués. 
D’un autre côté, les travailleurs permanents peuvent bénéficier de la 
présence de travailleurs temporaires dans l’entreprise, dans des situations 
où ces derniers servent de tampons en fournissant ainsi une protection aux 
travailleurs permanents contre une éventuelle mise à pied. De plus, il s’est 
avéré difficile pour les syndicats d’organiser les travailleurs temporaires. 
Cette situation limite évidemment le pouvoir tacite de négociation et l’accès 
à des droits pour les travailleurs temporaires. Elle vient également limiter 
la capacité des syndicats de négocier des conditions de travail et d’emploi 
équitables.
Pour les entreprises qui engagent des travailleurs temporaires, le fait 
d’investir dans un niveau élevé de motivation et d’engagement a moins 
d’attrait. L’engagement de salariés temporaires demeure actuellement 
et avant tout une stratégie managériale visant à créer une population 
marginale, qui peut être utilisée dans la création d’une flexibilité numérique 
servant de tampon, protégeant l’emploi des travailleurs permanents, qui 
forment le noyau de la force de travail et servant aussi à réduire les coûts 
d’opération.
De manière générale, les salariés préfèrent des emplois stables. Cela 
s’explique en grande partie par le fait qu’ils croient que les emplois 
permanents procurent de plus grands avantages. Plusieurs travailleurs 
temporaires cherchent à accéder à des postes permanents en acceptant 
d’abord des emplois temporaires. Quoiqu’ils ne préfèrent pas nécessairement 
des emplois temporaires, ils optent délibérément pour de tels emplois 
qui présentent des occasions de permanence. L’aspect instrumental (ou 
marchepied) ne s’applique pas à l’ensemble de la main-d’œuvre temporaire. 
Pour d’autres travailleurs, l’emploi temporaire peut s’avérer un piège. Pour 
eux, un traitement équitable pourrait améliorer leurs chances de bonifier 
leur capital humain et leur situation sur le marché du travail.
Pour tous les acteurs, trois types principaux d’influence peuvent être 
identifiés qui viennent en conflit avec la règle formelle d’un traitement 
équitable : la flexibilité de l’économie, la protection de la situation des 
travailleurs permanents et la mobilité du marché du travail. De plus, les 
intérêts conflictuels au sein des acteurs reposent principalement sur deux 
normes qui agissent en même temps : la protection des normes du travail 
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permanent et la maximisation des profits et du bien-être. À cause d’une 
répartition déséquilibrée du pouvoir entre les syndicats et les salariés, d’une 
part, et des entreprises, d’autre part, le pouvoir d’améliorer la protection 
des travailleurs temporaires dépend largement du gouvernement, qui alors 
détient la clef de la mise en œuvre d’un traitement équitable.
Les règles instituées par le gouvernement peuvent jouer un rôle dans 
la création d’avantages à long terme pour les travailleurs temporaires. 
Cependant, à cause des conflits institutionnels et inhérents au système eu 
égard à un traitement équitable, de telles mesures devraient se centrer sur 
l’amélioration de l’avenir à long terme des travailleurs temporaires plutôt 
qu’une bonification de la situation à court terme. Les politiques devraient 
se préoccuper avant tout de créer des débouchés plutôt que de promouvoir 
l’égalité.
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